TIER-1

Shubham Budhiraja [1] A filed a suit against B seeking mandatory injunction and mense profits. B filed O 7 R 11 seeking dismissal of suit for deficient court fees because for jurisdiction, the plaintiff valued at 2.5 crore but for court fees valued at Rs.250. The Delhi High court held that dual approach is not allowed. Once relief is valued as per suit valuation act then court fees has to be paid on it [2] .   (I)                  Though it is in the discretion of the plaintiff to value his suit as per his bona fide belief and discretion, but once he has valued his suit in terms of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, the court fee shall become payable on the same amount in terms of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act.   (II)                The plaintiff cannot adopt a dual policy of valuing his suit at a certain value for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purpose of payment of court fees . Once the suit has been valued at a certain value, the ad-volerum court fees have t

Shubham Budhiraja [1] A and B enters into a contract wherein dispute arose and A filed section 9 petition at Court at Vishakhapatnam seeking injunction against bank guarantee and forfeiture of security deposit and same was allowed. Thereafter, A sent letter to B seeking appointment of arbitrator and arbitrator was appointed by A. B questioned the validity of appointment and filed Section 11(6) petition in High Court of Orissa. A opposed the application relying upon section 42 of the act stating section 11(6) should have lied before High Court of Andhra Pradesh because section 9 petition was filed at Vishakhapatnam. However, High Court of Orissa allowed section 11(6) and appointed the arbitrator. Hon’ble Supreme Court setting aside the High Court order held that in that view of the matter considering Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh alone   would   have   jurisdiction   to   decide   the   subsequent applications   arising   out   of   the   Contra

Shubham Budhiraja [1] Company-ABC is a JV between company-A & company-B holding 50% each in ABC wherein Mr. X is the MD of company-A, chairman of company-B and chairman of company-ABC. Loan Agreement was entered between company-ABC and consortium of banks with personal guarantee of Mr. X. The account of company-ABC declared as NPA and banks assigned the debt to assets reconstruction company (ARC). In February 2020, settlement arrived between ARC and company-ABC. From 2011 to 2012, ABC keep asking for extension of payment and in 2013, ARC revoked the settlement and invoked Section 13(2) SARFESI. In 2014, personal guarantee of Mr. X also invoked. In 2018, Section 7 petition filed by ARC to which ABC took objection of limitation but NCLT allowed the petition. ARC contended that company-ABC has acknowledged the debt in their financial statements. However, NCLAT allowed the objection and dismissed the CIRP. Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the NCLAT judgment held that [2] :   (

  Whether  proceedings under  Section 420 IPC  are barred when the MM Court has acquitted the accused under Section 138 NI in a same or similar cause? [1] Shubham Budhiraja [2] (I)                  In the judgment of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr , (2012) 7 SCC 621 it was held that the requirement to prove an offence under the NI Act and an offence under the IPC is different , and it was observed that there may be some overlapping of facts but the ingredients of the offences are entirely different, therefore, the subsequent cases are not barred by any statutory provisions.   (II)                While in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of UP and Others , (2000) 2 SCC 636, and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and Anr , (2011) 2 SCC 703, the Court concluded that as per Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence on the same facts, therefore, the prosecution

    Shubham Budhiraja [1]   M/S A, importer & exporter, booked British Airways to send cargo of fruits and vegetables to Canada via London. Due to bad weather, the flight couldn't landed in Canada and goods damaged. British Airline offered to settle 50%. M/s A raised the claim and filed civil suit for recovery of damages. The Airline raised preliminary objection of limitation as suit was filed after expiry of 2 years, as stated in Rule 30 of Air act. The Trial court disallowed the objection stating that there is an acknowledgment of debt by Airline but High Court allowed the objection. Hon’ble Supreme Court confirmed the HC Judgment and held that Rule 30 extinguish the right. When right is not alive due to extinguished then remedy also extinguished. There is no remedy without right. [2]   (I)                  The Air Act, 1972 is an Act to give effect to various International Conventions for the unification of certain Articles relating to international carriage by ai

      Shubham Budhiraja [1]   A, B and C, shareholder has filed an Oppression Mismanagement petition against the Company. The Company filed an application raising an objection of maintainability for lack of 10% equity. The Company Court allowed the application and dismissed the petition. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court set aside the order and held that once it is accepted that the shareholder can also challenge the transfer of shareholding as being oppressive and as being intended only to defeat their rights to maintain the petition then an opportunity should have been granted to them to peruse the register of members and, if so advised, challenge the same in accordance with law. The Company Petition, on the averments made in the Petition itself, could not have been thrown out at the threshold without granting such opportunity to the petitioner. The test is whether, even if the facts pleaded by the Petitioner in his petition are assumed to be true, the Company Petition filed by

  Whether Delhi Joint Police Commissioner has power to revoke/suspend the Food Cafe license? Shubham Budhiraja [1] ABC cafe was called upon by Delhi police with a show cause notice (SCN) on the ground that they are operating beyond the permissible time duration and various FIR has been filed. On non-compliance of it, Jt. Commissioner of Delhi Police issued SCN calling for suspension of license. ABC cafe challenged the SCN arguing that the police commissioner has no power to suspend it. The High Court rejected the contention and upheld the police power. [2]   (I)                  The Delhi Eating Houses Registration Regulations, 1980 have been brought out with the previous sanction of the Administrator of Delhi, and in exercise of powers conferred under Clauses (Za) and (Xb) of sub-section 1 of Section 28, read with sub- sections(2) and (3) of Section 38 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978. Section 141(2) of the Delhi Police Act gives power to the licensing authority to suspend the licenses.

  Shubham Budhiraja [1] A holds share in family companies and LLP and after his death, his son and family acquire ownership in these companies and properties. B, A’s wife, filed civil suit and made Companies and LLP as parties. Defendant objected the jurisdiction of civil court on ground of bar under Section 430 of Companies act, 2013. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court rejected the said objection and held that civil court has jurisdiction to determine title in shares in the company especially when corporate body is a family enterprise. The Jurisdiction of NCLT is summary in nature which cannot decide complicated questions of fact involving evidence and cross-examination. [2]       (I)                  In Jai Mahal Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Devraj Singh and Ors., (2016) 1 SCC 423 , It was held that there is a thin line in appreciating the scope of jurisdiction of the Company Court/Company Law Board. The jurisdiction is exclusive if the matter truly relates to rectification but if the issu